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As early as Robert Marett’s 1902 essay “Origin and Validity in Ethics,” he 
announced that ethics was one amongst several “organised interests” of the human spirit 
that move people to action and he went on to note that feeling was central to its ability to 
accomplish this task, since “thought unsupported by feeling is powerless to found a habit 
of will” (p. 233; 240).  A consultation of Marett’s (1932) later book Faith, Hope and 
Charity in Primitive Religion confirms that he had not abandoned this idea by the time of 
his 1931-2 Gifford Lectures, and he was then even inclined to see religion as most 
importantly a source of feeling, and at least primitive religion as a source of those 
feelings that turn moral thoughts into spurs to action.  Something like these issues that 
preoccupied Marett make a late appearance in my own attempt to relate ethics and 
religion in what follows, though admittedly the key lines of debate and the theoretical 
tools I will want to bring to bear on them are so different from Marett’s own as to be 
nearly unrecognizable from within his own framework.  It seems clear, we might say, that 
from his time to ours everything has changed.  Everything except, that is, the most 
important questions, which still have a familiar ring.  So while I will start elsewhere than 
a close reading of Marett’s work, and I will end up somewhere other than he did, I hope 
the echoes of his concerns are audible nonetheless.      
Having already signaled a rapid shift to a more current idiom, let me turn 
immediately to noting that the very rapid growth of interest in the study of ethics has 
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been one of the most notable recent developments in anthropology.  From a marginal or 
at best background concern at the end of the last century, the anthropology of ethics has 
come to approach the status of something like a key trend in the contemporary discipline.  
With the ambition to lead a major reassessment of many core aspects of social theory – 
most notably those that hover around the nature of human action – and the promise to do 
so while opening up new horizons for ethnographic work by helping us attend to kinds of 
data we once ignored, the study of ethics has quickly achieved its lofty position by 
generating interest quite broadly throughout anthropology.  Indeed, cross-cutting sub-
disciplines and regional concerns, ethics is one of the few topics that is even a candidate 
to provide some unity to an increasingly fragmented field in which specialists more and 
more frequently struggle to find interest in work produced beyond their regional, topical, 
and theoretical borders.  Having made its way to the main stage of our sprawling 
discipline, the study of ethics is set to make a significant mark on how anthropology is 
practiced for the foreseeable future. 
There are surely many reasons the anthropology of ethics has taken off so quickly 
in the last several years, many of them related to the fact that looking back it is easy to 
see that it was absurd that it took so long to develop.  It seems obvious now, in ways it 
did not even fifteen years ago, that to have a human science that ignores the role of ethics 
in personal and social life has to be a mistake.  So the anthropology of ethics points to 
and then fills an important, almost embarrassing, gap in disciplinary thought, and the 
relatively straightforward claim that it does so has to be part of any story of its recent 
success.  But along with that explanation, I would like to suggest that another reason the 
anthropology of ethics has generated excitement so widely in the discipline is that it has 
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spent a lot of time at the frontier stage, in which there is as yet no normal science to stifle 
creativity and experiment, and in which the arrival of virtually every new journal issue 
holds out the promise of some novel approach to the topic worth looking into (Robbins 
2012a).  Those with an interest in Aristotle, or ordinary language philosophy, or the 
anthropological linguistic study of interaction, or phenomenology, or however we want to 
classify Foucault, or even the classical social theory of Durkheim and Weber all make 
contributions, and they can do so while studying all manner of topics, from state level 
politics to kinship, from gift giving to lying, from sickness to healing, and from religious 
piety to cutting edge business practices.  To this point, the anthropology of ethics has 
pitched a broad tent, and it is surely in part its habit of welcoming all comers that has 
allowed it to do so in the discipline’s center ring. 
Using an older terminology indebted to Thomas Kuhn (1996), we can call the 
welcoming quality of the anthropology of ethics that I have just described a pre-
paradigmatic openness.  I have mentioned it, and its likely role in the explosive growth of 
the field, because I have a sense that the era marked by this radical openness might soon 
draw to a close.  In the last few years, more and more people who contribute to the 
anthropological study of ethics have come to define what they study as “ordinary” or 
“everyday” ethics.  Ever since 2010, when Michael Lambek edited a landmark volume 
with the title “Ordinary Ethics,” one sees that phrase and its near cognate “everyday 
ethics” with increasing frequency in the literature.  They have become terms to conjure 
with, and this has been an important development, bringing some momentum toward 
theoretical progress to the anthropology of ethics to complement the widely creative but 
in no sense cumulative tendencies that have marked its frontier phase, and equally 
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notably generating real critical debate where there had once been mostly parallel play (e.g. 
Clarke 2014, Lempert 2013, Parkin n.d., Zigon 2014).  To again draw on broadly 
Kuhnian terms, the rise of everyday ethics signals, I think, that an intellectual maturation 
of the anthropology of ethics is afoot – it marks the advent of what Morgan Clarke (2014: 
419) calls ‘”discrete disciplinary pressures” as to what one’s proper subjects ought to be’ 
when one turns to the study of ethics -  and it seems likely that to whatever extent the 
anthropology of ethics does develop toward a state of normal science, it will be one that 
itself highlights the social equivalent of such normalcy as it unfolds under the sign of 
ordinary or everyday life. 
The increasing focus on the ordinary and the everyday, and the normalizing sense 
of disciplinary momentum it has brought to the anthropology of ethics, are all to the good, 
and I hope that nothing in my forgoing narration of its ascent to prominence suggests 
otherwise.  But of course every vantage point has its blind spots, and in what follows I 
want to take up one of the potential limits of the view from the ordinary and the everyday.  
The potential blind spot I am worried about is one that obscures the contribution of 
religion, or of the transcendent, to ethics.  Religion is not necessarily the opposite of the 
ordinary and everyday, but as an exercise it is worth considering such standard antonyms 
to these terms as “extraordinary,” “exceptional,” and “unusual” and noting that these 
terms all apply to the sacred and to religion more generally.  Understood as it often is in 
these terms, the sacred seems a notion that does not effortlessly inhabit the world of the 
ordinary and the everyday. 
I recognize that these quick semantic observations invite all kinds of quibbling, 
but I make them by way of introducing a more empirically grounded point, which is that 
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up until now, religion really has not been central to the theorization of everyday, ordinary 
ethics.  Thus Lambek’s and Veena Das’s influential, founding theoretical statements of 
the ordinary ethics position do not draw on theories of religion, even as they do 
sometimes take up Austin-inspired accounts of ritual performativity as an aspect of 
everyday linguistic interaction.
1
  And James Laidlaw’s (2014) path breaking book-length 
construction of the field, which while not framed as a work of ordinary ethics per se is in 
sustained and careful dialogue with this development, likewise does not draw much on 
theory of religion in laying out its approach.  There is an irony here, of course, in that 
Lambek is one of the leading anthropological scholars of religion at work today, and 
Laidlaw, along with many others who contribute to the ordinary ethics discussion would 
also, in their other work, count as important contributors to this field.  All of them are 
comfortable handling religious materials, which, for example, make up the majority of 
the examples in Laidlaw’s book.  But, I want to suggest, considerations of the nature of 
religion as a phenomenon, as opposed to empirical data on religious life, have not so far 
figured much in their construction of anthropological theories of ethics.  My ultimate aim 
in this article is to ask what difference it would make were they to do so. 
 
The Ordinary and the Religious 
 Though most of us probably have a strong sense that we know everyday life when 
we see it, the ordinary and the everyday can be somewhat elusive notions when one 
approaches them with definitional intent (Sayeau 2013: 8).  And in a critical mood one 
might want to note that they also have a history, and mostly a modern one, and so as 
concepts they are not always as innocent or uncomplicated as they sometimes appear to 
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be.  For present purposes, however, it is enough simply to indicate how those who 
promote the study of everyday or ordinary ethics reflect on their own use of these terms.  
Two widely cited statements from the key figures in the field that I have already 
mentioned are worth exploring in this regard.  After referring to Aristotle to make the 
point that ethics is first of all ordinary in the sense that it is “basic to the human 
condition,” Lambek (2010a: 2), in his introduction to his volume on ordinary ethics, goes 
on to add that “[s]econd…the ‘ordinary’ implies an ethics that is relatively tacit, 
grounded in agreement rather than rule, in practice rather than knowledge or belief, and 
happening without calling undue attention to itself.”  Das (2012: 134), who like Lambek 
relies in part on work in ordinary language philosophy, asserts in somewhat similar tones 
in essay entitled “Ordinary Ethics” that what is called for is “a shift in perspective from 
thinking of ethics as made up of judgments we arrive at when we stand away from our 
ordinary practices to that of thinking of the ethical as a dimension of everyday life in 
which we are not aspiring to escape the ordinary but rather to descend into it as a way of 
becoming moral subjects.”  From this point of view, ethical work “is done not by 
orienting oneself to transcendental, agreed-upon values but rather through the cultivation 
of sensibilities within the everyday” (her emph.).  It is not difficult to detect, even from 
these brief snippets of text, a binary scaffolding on which the sense of the everyday at 
work in them rests.  The everyday, at least in these accounts, is for the tacit against the 
explicit, the practiced against the known or believed, sensibility over values and rules, 
and the imminent over the transcendent.  If we take all of the discarded terms together – 
the explicit, the known and believed, the codified rule, values, and the transcendent, it is 
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hard not suspect that religion is an important part of what the everyday is not, and what 
ordinary ethics does not, to use a favored expression of Das’s (138, 146), “leap” over into. 
 The point that the everyday is decidedly not religious is even occasionally made 
explicit, at least in passing, in the texts from which I have been quoting.  Thus, in noting 
that ethics is ordinary because it is “basic” to human life, Lambek (2010a: 2) suggests 
that “it need not be singled out as an explicit category or department of human thought 
nor constituted, as Maurice Bloch (1992 and elsewhere) sees religion and as some 
philosophers have seen metaphysics, at the expense of the ordinary.”  He then goes on to 
contrast everyday settings to contexts that at least sound religious in which ethics does 
become explicit, such as “in prophetic movements of social and ethical renewal; 
and…among priestly classes attempting to rationalize and educate.”  And turning again to 
Das (138), one of her aims is to show “how dramatic enactments of ethical value, as in 
publicly performed rituals…are grounded within the normative practices of everyday 
life.”  Here religious ritual is secondary, and more generally in ordinary ethics a turn to 
religion on the part of the people we study has a slight tinge of a fall from grace.  
Religion – with its supposed habits of distanced reflection, love of explicitly formulated 
rules and values, and tendency to speak in imperative tones – is only necessary for those 
who somehow cannot work out their ethical lives in the comfortable immanence of the 
everyday.  A harshly lit realm of imposing, codified demands, rather than quiet, smoothly 
unfolding skilled practice, the transcendent comes off from the ordinary point of view as 
an agent of rough justice at best, and a source of profound alienation from truly ethical 
human living at worst. 
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 The goal of my argument from here on out is to suggest that this is not a fair 
account of the religious or the transcendent.  For one thing, as Webb Keane (2010: 69) 
has reminded us in one his contributions to the anthropological understanding of ethics, 
human beings really do sometimes stand back from the flow of their lives – it’s the kind 
of thing that, as human beings, they can do, and often enough they resort to it.  Such 
standing back, I want to suggest, is not less basic to people’s ethical existence than their 
ability to participate in the flow of everyday life.  And for another thing, what humans 
learn from such exercises of standing back from or “leaping out” of the everyday can, 
pace Das, inform their everyday ethics at least as much as it is grounded in them.  For 
these reasons, I think the anthropological study of ethics would be impoverished if it 
were reduced to the study only of its ordinary, everyday forms, and in fact maybe the 
everyday itself does not make sense without some attention to the religious as well. 
 I am going to develop my argument in two steps.  In the first, I want to present an 
understanding of religion as at least in part a matter of the transcendent, and more 
importantly to offer an image of the transcendent that is not as scary – neither as 
metaphysically alienating nor as demanding – as it often appears to be from an ordinary 
ethics point of view.  Then, in the second, I want to look at one form of transcendent 
religious representation – the representations of values produced by ritual – to begin to 
sketch a picture of how religion informs ethical life in ways that do not explain away or 
traduce its everyday qualities, but that at the same time do not leave them to stand wholly 
on their own. 
 
On the Transcendent 
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Our English word “transcendence” is derived from Latin terms that mean “to 
surpass” or “to go beyond” (Van Harvey 1964: 242).  Merriam Webster online suggests 
that current usage stays close to these roots, offering as the first two glosses: “exceeding 
usual limits : surpassing” and “extending or lying beyond the limits of ordinary 
experience.”  The sense in which the transcendent is defined in opposition to the 
everyday is evident here.  It is, however, worth pausing over what we want to mean by 
“exceeding” and “surpassing.”  In some sense, I think these can be taken as simply 
descriptive terms, pointing to a slightly less freighted notion of being “beyond” the 
ordinary than we might be tempted to imagine.  But they also carry with them some sense 
of the elevated, the excessive, or the magisterial that ordinary ethicists point to when 
painting the transcendent as awe-inspiring and commanding in ways that block the 
desirable flow of the everyday.  It is this sense of the imposing quality of the transcendent 
that I want to dial back here, though not mute entirely.  Put more positively, I want to 
foreground a kinder, gentler side of the transcendent that we might take to enrich rather 
than destroy the everyday, even as it does not collapse into it. 
  But before I turn to illuminating the friendlier face of the transcendent, let me 
pause briefly to note that I am happy to identify religion with the transcendent more 
generally.  I do not want to dwell on this point, which would immediately detain us in the 
deep waters that churn around the very cross-cultural validity of the concept of religion, 
but mostly just to accept it for the purposes of the argument I making.  Durkheim’s 
minimal definition of religion as pertaining to sacred matters that are beyond and sharply 
separated from profane ones paints the religious as transcendent in relation to the 
everyday in a straightforward way I am happy to accept here.  Csordas’ (2004) 
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identification of religion with alterity, to take a more recent example, points in broadly 
similar directions.  Even as I find intriguing the suggestion made by proponents of axial 
age theories that some religions stress or greatly extend the distance of the sacred from 
the profane, such that we might differentiate religions from one another on the basis of 
the varying degrees of transcendence upon which they insist, I will from here on out work 
with the assumption that all social phenomena we might want to call religions are built 
around at least some notion of transcendence (Robbins 2009).  Taking this point as given 
from here on out, the question I want to ask is how we might best think of the 
transcendent realm of religion when our primary goal is to contribute to the 
anthropological study of ethics.  Should we see it primarily as a realm from which issue 
fearsome divine commands or distressing encouragements to leave behind the worldly 
concerns of the everyday altogether, or might we see it as having a different kind of 
contribution to make to ethical life? 
 A good starting point for reconsidering the nature of the transcendent is the work 
Alfred Schutz, the well known social philosopher with strong connections to both Husserl 
and Weber.  It is Schutz’s phenomenological side that most interests us here, for it leads 
him to argue that transcendence is inescapable in human life – for there are always things 
that are important to us that are outside our immediate perceptual experience but that we 
can represent to ourselves by means of various kinds of signs.  Based on the different 
ways in which the things we represent to ourselves are beyond immediate experience, 
Schutz lays out three categories of transcendence – the “little,” “medium” and “great” 
transcendencies (Schutz and Luckmann 1989:105).  Little transcendencies are those in 
which the transcendent item is presently beyond our immediate perceptual experience, 
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but could have been part of that experience in the past and may be so again in the future.  
When I leave the living room to enter the kitchen, the living room is now transcendent in 
relation to my immediate experience, though I can always turn back and make it present 
once again.  Middle transcendencies, for Schutz, are other people, whom we realize have 
an inner life like our own which we can never experience directly.  The inner experience 
of my friends can never be present to me the way the living room can, but Schutz 
suggests that it is still they case that we feel we overcome the gap between us much of the 
time.  Therefore, Schutz asserts that the little and the medium transcendencies are alike in 
that the “boundaries of experience that are being crossed are everyday ones, and the 
crossings themselves are likewise everyday ones” (p. 145).  By contrast, the great 
transcendencies, which include religion (as well as theoretical thinking and dreaming), 
involve objects we realize we can never experience directly in everyday terms.  We have 
to leave everyday life, or what Schutz, in Husserlian terms, calls the natural attitude, and 
take on an “unnatural attitude” in which we take a distance from our normal practical 
motives and structures of relevance, if we want to experience such great transcendencies 
in their immediacy rather than just represent them to ourselves (125, 130). 
 On Schutz’s model, as I have just laid it out, we are entangled in transcendence all 
the time, so in itself transcendence is nothing special.  As he notes, in a statement I think 
is worth pondering more thoroughly than I am able to here for what it suggests about how 
to think about the everyday, without representations of transcendent phenomena, what he 
calls “appresentations,” “a person would remain to a considerable extent caught within 
the limits of the flux of actually present experiences; without the appresentations 
themselves, completely caught.  There would be life and lived experiences, perhaps even 
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encounters, but no life-world” (132, his emph.).  So the everyday is shot through, even 
constituted in large part by, transcendence.  But even so, the great transcendencies, and 
religion among them, do in experiential terms take us beyond the everyday.  They build 
on very basic human experiential and representational capacities, but to produce effects 
that, we might say, are not themselves quite so basic. 
 Unfortunately, Schutz does not give us much of a sense of the kind of things that 
are represented in the great transcendencies.  He tells us how we can get to religious 
transcendence without having to abandon representational paths that have a lot in 
common with those upon which we always walk, but he does not tell us what to expect 
inside the transcendent realm once we enter it.  For that, we are going to have to turn to 
some anthropologists. 
 Maurice Bloch’s work is helpful here.  He has recently offered an account of 
religion that roots it in the human cognitive capacity of imagination.  Though Bloch is 
working in a different theoretical lineage than Schutz, I think there is enough overlap in 
their concerns, particularly a shared interest in the nature of different kinds of human 
cognition, that we can usefully draw on Bloch to help us get beyond the point where 
Schutz leaves us.  At the heart of Bloch’s model of religion is a distinction between what 
he calls the transactional and the transcendental social.  The transactional social consists 
in the give and take of everyday life, a fluid arena open to change in which people assert 
themselves, sometimes manipulate or try to influence others, and more generally (and 
here I am drawing on some of Bloch’s earlier work – see Bloch and Parry 1989) mostly 
work to reach relatively short term, sometimes fully achievable, goals (Bloch 2008: 
2056).   By contrast, the transcendental social is made up of “essentialized roles and 
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groups” of the kind social anthropologists have long taken as the prime constituents of 
social structure (2008: 2056).  People see these roles as more or less immutable and 
fixed.  Individual occupants of idealized roles may leave them for various reasons, 
including role failure and death, but the roles and groups will continue to exist.  It is for 
this reason that social structure in general appears to people to have a “permanence which 
negates the fluidity of life” and therefore transcends it (Bloch 2012: 114).  For Bloch, 
then, the transcendence of the transcendental social has to do in part with being 
impervious to the flux of the everyday as constituted by the transactional social.  But 
Bloch also explains such transcendence in terms that come much closer to those of 
Schutz, for he too stresses that people cannot perceive roles and groups directly.  Instead, 
they must be products of the imagination that become socially shared and are therefore 
represented to experience, rather than given to it directly. 
 Like Schutz, Bloch does not completely separate the transcendental from the 
transactional, even as he continues to preserve its distinctiveness.  As he puts it, there “is 
plenty of transactional social in human sociality that occurs side by side or in 
combination with the transcendental social”, and people may “use the existence of the 
transcendental social as one of the many counters used in the transactional game” (2008: 
2056).  To illustrate this point, and his argument more generally, Bloch discusses a 
Malagasy village elder he has known for many years.  By the time Bloch writes his essay, 
this elder has become very old, somewhat senile and physically weak.  He spends most 
days curled up in a blanket.  Yet people continue to approach him with respect, deference 
and fear, and in ritual contexts they always put him in charge so that he can bless the 
participants.  At the same time, however, people no longer involve this man in the 
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transactional contexts in which they play the “Machiavellian game of influence,” and in 
this respect they are happy to leave him out of the flow of “everyday” transactional social 
life (2008:2056).  He has lost most of his transactional footing, and more and more is 
treated by those around him only in his transcendent role – a last step toward finally 
achieving an ancestral existence even more fully beyond the transactional world. 
 The everyday for Bloch is thus a realm in which people mix and/or shuttle back 
and forth between transactional and transcendental conceptualizations of who they and 
others are and what they and others are doing.  What we tend to call the transcendent or 
religious, he argues, is a realm much more solely focused the idealized roles and groups 
generated out of the imagination.  So following Bloch, part of the answer to the question 
Schutz left us with, the question of what kinds of things can be found to populate the 
realm of the transcendent, is that it is filled with the kinds of roles and groups we have 
called social structure.  But surely there must also exist other inhabitants of the 
transcendent.  One I would like to suggest is values.  I do not mean to imply that values 
are the only constituents of the transcendent besides idealized roles and groups, just that 
they are another one that is worth examining for anthropologists of religion.  We might, 
in this connection, recall that values are one of things that Das assigned to the 
transcendent and thereby defined the ordinary against, and that Lambek (2010b: 61), 
though he has carried out important work on ethical values elsewhere (2008), in a second 
essay on ordinary ethics that is a companion to the one from which I drew above also 
states explicitly that values (along with rules) are not, as he conceives of things, part of 
the “substance” of ethics.  I want to suggest that there are resources available in the 
anthropology of religion that can help us avoid such summary judgment about values and 
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can thereby help us round out our understanding not only of ethics in general, but 
ultimately also of its ordinary varieties. 
 
On Ritual, Values and Transcendence 
At least in terms of throwing values into the transcendent box, I think Das has a 
point.  While I do not want to tarry too long with defining values in an article that is 
already a bit heavy with definitional exertions, let us take values as representations of the 
good or what people take to be, all things considered, desirable.  That is to say, whether 
or not people at every moment desire the things values represent, people do acknowledge 
in a second order way that they are worth desiring.  They know, to put it in terms that 
bear more centrally on issues of ethics, that it is good to desire them, even if this does not 
mean their desire for them is constant.  Like roles and groups then, people do not always 
immediately experience values in their fullest form in the ordinary course of things  – 
sometimes during the flow of everyday life the ethical desire values are capable of 
awakening is not to the fore - yet people can still, on reflection, appreciate their 
desirability.  This is one sense in which we can say values at times transcend ordinary 
experience. 
But there is also a second reason that it makes sense to talk about values as 
transcendent.  In all social systems, as I have argued elsewhere drawing on the works of 
Dumont, Weber, and Berlin, values at times come into conflict with one another (Robbins 
2013).  To take a case that it to hand from some recent reading, many people who were 
liberal, elite university students in the United States in the late 1930s up through 1940, 
having grown up in long shadow of World War I, felt very strongly attached to the values 
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of peace and justice.  The question of whether the United States should remain 
isolationist or join World War II became a problem for them when these two values came 
into conflict, raising issues of when peace could be abandoned for the sake of justice, and 
when it could not (Gilkey 2001: 4-10).  This clash of values is quite dramatic, but we are 
all familiar with others that are less so both from our own lives and from our fieldwork.  
In academic lectures, I sometimes illustrate this point by reminding people of the clash of 
the academic values of honesty and politeness that sometimes arise when someone asks 
us what we thought of their presentation, or, drawing on something that used to show up 
in a lot of ethnographies, I bring up the conflict people in many places regularly 
experience between realizing values tied to affinity and those tied to kinship.  Because 
conflicts frequently beset the realization of values in everyday life in this way, I do not 
think we find them worked out in very full or coherent form there.  For reasons I will 
come back to, we feel the conflicting pulls of values in the everyday, but mostly we 
muddle along without sorting out fully what any one value really looks like or demands 
of us.  This may in fact be part of what Das appreciates about everyday life, and it 
certainly supports her casting of “transcendent…values” out of it.2  But if conflicts 
between values mean we do not usually experience the full force of any one of them in 
the course of ordinary living, where in our experience do we encounter that force?  Here I 
want to follow Bloch and suggest that one place we find it is in the transcendent as that 
comes to us in through our participation in the realm of religion. 
I have recently made an argument about values that is similar to the one I am 
making here that suggests that one place people find clearly articulated versions of single 
values is in ritual (Robbins 2015).
3
  Since developing that argument, I have discovered 
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that Victor Turner had made a very similar one in his classic 1964 (1967) piece “Symbols 
in Ndembu Ritual.”  Here I want to lay out his way of constructing the argument, as I 
think it stays more neatly within anthropological boundaries than my own previous one, 
and also because I can flesh it out, as he does, with his rich Ndembu ethnography. 
The ritual upon which Turner focuses in his article is the Nkang’a, the “girl’s 
puberty ritual” of the Ndembu of northwestern Zambia (1967: 20).  Like all Ndembu 
rituals, Nkang’a has a dominant, or what the Ndembu call a “senior,” symbol (20).  
Dominant symbols in Ndembu ritual are usually trees, and for Nkang’a the tree in 
question is the mudyi tree, at the base of which the novice lies, wrapped in a blanket.  
When the light bark of this tree is scratched, it exudes a milky white latex, and the 
Ndembu regard this as its key characteristic, leading turner to refer to it as the “milk tree” 
(20).  The matrilineal Ndembu build on this feature of the tree to interpret it as 
symbolizing breast milk, breasts more generally, bonds between mothers and children, 
matriliny, tribal custom and finally, “at its highest level of abstraction…the unity and 
continuity of Ndembu society” (21).  When Turner asked Ndembu to tell him what the 
tree and the rite in which it plays a central role mean, these were the answers they gave 
him. 
Focused as they are on social structural categories from the family to the 
matrilineal clan and ultimately Ndembu society as a whole, Ndembu discussions of the 
Nkang’a clearly dwell on categories belonging to what Bloch would call the 
transcendental social.  But, Turner tells us, in conversations on the ritual the Ndebmu are 
also talking about values – aspects of their social life, such as corporate belonging (1968: 
23), that they find desirable.  As he puts it, regardless of whatever practical ends a ritual 
 19 
may aim at, such as turning a girl into a marriageable women, the dominant symbols at 
the center of them may be regarded as “ends in themselves, as representative of the 
axiomatic values of the widest Ndembu society” (32).  Drawing on a further aspect of his 
argument, we might even suggest that it is rituals which “create” these values, or at least 
lend them the desirable quality that makes them more than inert ideals.  This is where it is 
important to recall Turner’s once famous argument that major symbols have both a 
sensory pole - one that refers to experience-near, or in Schutz’s terms directly 
perceptible, “natural and physiological phenomena and processes” - and an ideological 
pole that refers to core social values (28).  Part of what ritual does, on Turner’s account, 
is to attach the strong positive associations of important immediate experiences like 
breast feeding to abstract, transcendental values like matriliny and the unity of social 
groups (21, 29-30).  By deploying symbols that affect such a transfer between the sensory 
and the ideological, ritual becomes “precisely a mechanism that periodically converts the 
obligatory into the desirable” (30).  Here, then, is an account of ritual that focuses on its 
ability to present participants with clearly articulated representations of transcendental 
ideals of great importance for the societies in which they live and to render those ideals 
desirable in ways that turn them into values. 
But why do people need to “leap” out of everyday life in order to encounter such 
values?  Why is it difficult, if not impossible, for them to find experiences of them in 
everyday life.  Why, to refer back to Schutz, do values belong to the great 
transcendencies, rather than to those little and middles transcendencies that can be easily 
accessed from within ordinary life?  Turner has an answer to this question which 
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dovetails nicely with the very brief argument I made above that value conflicts render the 
appearance of values in the everyday mostly partial and compromised. 
Characteristically, Turner addresses this issue by way of some subtle 
ethnographic observations.   The Ndembu are matrilineal and virilocal – mothers and 
children live in their husband’s and father’s villages, but they inherit their land and social 
status from their mother’s or grandmother’s group.  Ndembu life is thus subject to all the 
tensions that are well known to beset what Levi-Strauss (1969), in an apt phrase, used to 
call “disharmonic regimes.”  There are predictable tensions, for example, between men 
and women, mothers and daughters, father’s and sons, and mother’s brother’s and sister’s 
sons.  Values attaching to different relationship are often “incompatible” and people 
“who observe one set of norms find that they may transgress equally rules belonging to 
another set” (1968: 10-11).  Turner’s genius shows in his recognition that even as 
Ndembu people, when they tell him about Nkang’a, mention only the core values of 
various kinds of corporate unity that it upholds through the symbolism of the milk tree, 
by ritual design they practice the rite in ways that give expression to many of the tensions 
that compromise the realization of these values in daily life.  For example, as women 
dance around the tree and the novice lying at its base, they dramatize opposition to men 
by taunting them and preventing them from joining most parts of the dance (23).  In 
being enacted for a single novice, the rite also opposes her to other girls, and to the group 
of adult women she is about to join, who are represented during the rite as making her 
suffer (23).  So too, the novice’s mother is opposed to the group of adult women, who 
prevent her from dancing around the tree.  This, Turner notes, represents “the conflict 
between the matricentric family and the wider society…articulated by matriliny” (24).  
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And in Turner’s essay, the list of enacted conflicts goes on (24-25).  In practice, the ritual 
exhibits in clear form the kinds of everyday value conflicts that beset ordinary Ndembu 
life. 
As Turner interprets this fact, it does not invalidate the statements Ndembu 
routinely make that the tree and the ritual that takes place around it express the values of 
various kinds of group solidarity.  Rather, he proffers, the values are central to the rite 
and the enacted conflicts only serve to stress their importance.  This is so because in 
rituals such as Nkang’a the “raw energies of conflict are domesticated into the service of 
social order” (39).  Now, this is a common Manchester School kind of claim, and I am 
not sure precisely how Turner argues for it here (it does not, for example, in any way 
follow directly from his argument about the polar qualities of symbols, upon which he 
based his claim that ritual makes values desirable).  But I think he is on to something 
nonetheless.  I would argue that the ritual has this effect precisely by suggesting that the 
dominant symbol does not itself represent the conflicts enacted around it, but rather 
actively overcomes them in the process of rendering clear expressions of “norms and 
values in their abstract purity” (38).  It is as if ritual dramatizes in its unfolding the 
transcendental imperviousness of values to the evanescent, changeable, sometimes 
conflicted qualities of the everyday to which Bloch drew our attention.  It does so by first 
giving vivid expression to everyday value conflicts, but then, in the course of its 
progression, “demonstrating” that it is possible to realize a single value or, as Turner puts 
it, “closely, and on the whole harmoniously, interrelated” values, on their own, in 
something approaching their transcendental form (40). 
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I can perhaps make this last point more clearly by turning briefly to an example of 
a ritual drawn from my own fieldwork among the Urapmin of the West Sepik Province of 
Papua New Guinea.  During the period of my fieldwork in the early 1990s, the Urapmin 
were relatively recent converts to a charismatic form of Christianity.  By the time I 
arrived in Urapmin, everyone in the community had converted and Christianity was at the 
center of much of people’s public and private lives.  As I have discussed in detail 
elsewhere, in Urapmin Christian morality has come into conflict with a tradition of 
Urapmin moral thinking in which aggressive, self-interested behavior they call “willful” 
is valued to some extent, provided it is balanced by what they define as “lawful” behavior 
oriented toward the legitimate expectations and demands of others.  Even after 
conversion, the conduct of much of Urapmin social life continues to demand both willful 
and lawful behavior.  This demand is rendered problematic, however, by the fact that 
Urapmin Christian morality defines all willful feelings and actions as sinful, and it 
enjoins people only to experience and act on lawful thoughts and feelings if they want to 
be saved.  The goal of Urapmin Christians is therefore to cultivate an “easy” or “quiet” 
heart filled with “good thinking” that will lead them to live a lawful “Christian life” 
(Robbins 2004). 
Given that traditional and Christian morality conflict in Urapmin, and that people 
there still need to rely on traditional patterns of moral action in key stretches of everyday 
life, their lives are marked by a conflict between the values of willfulness and lawfulness.  
Everyday life, in particular, rarely provides a setting in which Urapmin feel they have 
resolved this conflict, and this leads them to define themselves as deeply sinful people.  
But in their Christian rituals, they regularly do endeavor to create images of 
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uncompromised lawfulness and to perform such lawfulness for themselves.  To illustrate 
this point, I want to consider just one of their Christian rituals, the Sunday morning 
church service.
4
 
Urapmin attend church services quite frequently, sometimes even twice daily.  Of 
all services, however, those on Sunday morning are the most well attended and are 
treated as important community-wide events.  For this reason, I will focus on the Sunday 
morning service, though my analysis of the way the service aims to realize the value of 
lawfulness would fit other services as well. 
As with the Ndembu Nkanga rite, the Urapmin Sunday service, even as it aims at 
realizing the value of lawfulness, also allows for, and gives ritual expression to, the value 
of willfulness.  It cannot escape doing this, I will suggest, because its overall temporal 
structure is constructed so as to enact the lawful overcoming of the will, so it must 
display willfulness in its very design.  We can see this theme at work even in the way 
Urapmin describe the process by which people come to participate in the rite.  In order to 
take part in the Sunday service, people must come, as the Urapmin put it, “inside the 
Church.”  The inside/outside opposition is an important one for Urapmin Christianity.  It 
is “inside the church,” or as they sometimes say “inside God’s fence” (like penned pigs 
prevented from destroying human gardens) or “inside the Christian life,” that people are 
best able to maintain easy hearts and practice lawfulness.  As soon as people “go outside” 
the church or “jump the fence” of Christian life, they enter a world in which it is very 
difficult not to sin. 
Given this understanding of the inside/outside opposition, we can interpret what 
Urapmin mean by coming “inside the church” as leaving the everyday and its value 
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conflicts behind.  Glossed in this way, it should not come as a surprise that Urapmin do 
not always find it easy to enter the Church.  Services begin when the pastor rings the bell 
to call people to church.  There are always a few people who respond quickly to the bell, 
come inside the church and begin to sing hymns. But most Sunday mornings many other 
people feel too caught up in matters of the outside to make a quick break from it when 
they hear the bell.  They dawdle over eating, dressing up, finishing conversations or other 
matters that anchor them in the everyday.  This difference in response ensures that almost 
all church services begin with a confrontation between lawfulness, as evidenced by the 
behavior of the pastor (in church before anyone else) and the early responders to his call, 
and those who straggle in late.  Those already in attendance grumble about the 
willfulness of the latecomers and charge them with “wasting time for church.”  Their 
complaining counts as willful in itself while at the same time highlighting the willfulness 
of those who have arrived late or who have not yet arrived at all.  By means of this 
regularly repeated scenario, even the process of beginning a service unfolds as a struggle 
between lawfulness and willfulness. 
Once everyone has come inside, marking a first victory for lawful comportment, 
the service proper begins with a prayer, offered by someone nominated by the pastor.  
These prayers inevitably include statements about human willfulness and the way it 
pushes people to sin and then describes the purpose of the church service as allowing 
people to receive God’s word in their heart, so that they can become lawful.  The opening 
prayer is followed by hymn singing and then a period given over to speeches by local 
politicians known as big men.  These speeches often take up “outside” matters, such as 
disputes or the difficulties facing one or other major collective project, and the 
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discussions they initiate are often marked by willfulness and anger.  Thus they represent 
another expression of willfulness in the midst of the church service. 
But once the speeches and the discussion around them are finished and someone 
has offered another prayer, the pastor begins his sermon.  Sermons are at the center of 
Urapmin church services, and they mark the moment during the rite at which willfulness 
begins to be definitively overcome.  As the prayer before the sermon is spoken, attention 
shifts to the pulpit at the front of the church – the part of the church most identified with 
lawfulness, for only those known to be free of recent willful sins can preach or sit as 
deacons on the raised platform upon which the pulpit resets.  Like the opening prayer, 
Urapmin sermons always in one way or another dwell on the importance of lawfulness 
and the suppression of the will.  More than this, they often explicitly address the way in 
which listening to the sermon in the correct manner itself counts as lawful behavior, 
while poor attention is itself willful.  Here is an example of explicit preaching on this 
issue taken from a Sunday sermon: 
You come inside and you look at each other, you look over to your friend, he looks back 
at his friend, you move your head around, turn your head from side to side. If you do that, 
if you are making noise, you won’t be able to receive God’s talk. God’s talk will not be 
bound (get stuck) in your heart….Just come in quietly and sit down and whatever kind of 
man is giving talk or news, you think about it and you be peaceful. Then he [Jesus] will 
come and take you. You Christian people, you yourselves will get heaven, God’s 
kingdom (Robbins 2004: 265-66). 
 
Both in representational content and in the nature of its correct audition, then, the sermon 
portion of the service focuses on the value of lawfulness. 
 The sermon is sometimes followed by a period in which various members of the 
congregation “support” its message by reiterating what the pastor has said about the need 
for lawfulness and its link to salvation.  Then, there comes a final prayer.  This prayer is 
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distinguished from all others in the service by the fact that after a prayer leader chosen by 
the pastor begins the prayer, everyone in the congregation prays loudly at the same time, 
creating a cacophonous roar of simultaneous voices that eventually fall away, leaving the 
prayer leader alone to conclude by naming each of the families in attendance and asking 
one by one that God bless them all.  People then stand up and begin milling around the 
church and shaking hands, an important lawful gesture in Urapmin life generally 
(Robbins 2012b).  This final act of the rite can lost a long time, for each person is careful 
to shake the hand of everyone else in attendance.  The mood during this time is notably 
“light” and relaxed - it has about it something of Durkheim’s ritual effervescence.   
 The hand shaking has this effervescent quality, which the service mostly lacks 
until this point, because, I would suggest, this is the moment in the rite when lawfulness 
has finally come to full expression.  It is when people realize the value of lawfulness in 
its fullest form as something they themselves are capable of realizing in their own 
performance.  Indeed, I would extend this point by suggesting that Durkheimian 
effervescence is precisely what it feels like to realize a value fully– to realize something 
transcendent in its transcendent form, rather than in the piecemeal, often compromised 
forms in which ones realizes values, if one realizes them at all, in ordinary life.  As it 
happens, Durkheim comes pretty close to making this argument himself and in doing so 
he takes up some issues not too far removed from those that concerned Marett in the 
works on ethics and religion that I mentioned at the outset.  In order to consider how 
Durkheim does so, I turn to a short concluding section where the main issue I want to 
take up is how this foray into the transcendent realm as it appears through the window of 
religion might inform our consideration of ethics even in its ordinary, everyday forms. 
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Conclusion: Back to Ordinary Ethics 
 Just before Turner (1967: 30) tells us how rituals make values an object of desire 
for their participants, he notes that “Durkheim was fascinated by the problem of why 
many social norms and imperatives were felt to be at the same time ‘obligatory’ and 
‘desirable.’”  Unfortunately, Turner does not reference any particular works of Durkheim 
at this point, and in previous readings of his essay I thought he was making a very general 
point about Durkheim, one that I found plausible but that did not really feature in my own 
core reading of the great sociologist.  More recently, however, I have come to realize that 
Turner must have been referring to a specific essay of Durkheim’s: his 1906 piece “The 
Determination of Moral Facts” (Durkheim 1974, see also Karsenti 2012 for an important 
reading of this text).
5
  It is here that Durkheim takes issue with Kant in a way that is 
crucial for our understanding of his approach to ethics.  Against a Kantian emphasis on 
the demandingness of moral norms, he argues that moral ends cannot be merely a matter 
of duty or obligation, they must also be “desirable and desired” (45).  If they were not 
desirable, Durkheim asserts, no one would act on them.  A sense of duty alone is not 
enough to mobilize human action.  The desirability of values, Durkheim goes on to 
suggest, is produced by experiences of the sacred, and therefore of society and of 
collective sentiments that transcend the individual.  Soon we are in the territory of 
Durkheim’s famous later argument about the ritual production of effervescence and its 
role in making society something people feel is greater than, even better than, themselves.  
In this essay, though, the key point is that the socially derived power of the sacred makes 
values themselves, rather than society more generally, an object of desire.  To this 
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account of how the unusual, uplifting energy of collective sociality creates such 
desirability, I have added the suggestion that the ways ritual allows people to touch 
transcendent values in their fullest forms – to perform those values for themselves and 
see the shape of their complete realization – enables the desirability of single values to 
gain a hold on people that it can rarely manage to secure in everyday life. 
 But, and this is where I want to bring my argument to rest, even in the course of 
everyday life, some of the desirability of values that is produced in transcendent 
encounters with them must surely still be felt.
6
  In the everyday, persons do not, for 
reasons we have discussed, often attempt to realize single value-linked desires fully.  But 
the pushes and pulls different values exert give everyday life much of its sense of 
forward-movement, or at least of ethical potential.  Although Das (2012: 138) holds out 
some hope of making habit central to everyday moral accomplishment, she, and even 
more so Lambek and Laidlaw (2014: 198-199), see some kind of reflection as a key 
component of ordinary ethics.  What I have hoped to indicate here at the end of my 
argument is that it is the sometimes insistent but often rather more gentle ethical desires 
various values set in play in the everyday that tip us into reflection and drive the 
evaluative impulses that saturate ordinary life.  Ultimately, these desires and the moral 
energies they produce have their roots in the sometimes but not always friendlier face of 
transcendence I have tried to bring into view here, but their forces are felt far from the 
transcendent realms in which they are produced.  Without moving theoretical work on 
religion into the center of the anthropological study of ethics, this is a crucial aspect of 
ethical life I think we are likely to miss.  
                                                  
Notes 
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1
 As implied in the text, Lambek’s references to ritual theory are only an apparent 
exception to this point.  His interest is in Rappaport’s performative theory of ritual, which 
in an essay that is a companion to the one I am discussing here he rightly relates 
immediately back to Austin and then to ordinary language philosophy (Lambek 2010b: 
41).  Ritual, in the sense Lambek uses it in this context, then becomes a quality of 
“virtually all speaking” (48, see 54) and he does not attend to any qualities of ritual he 
identifies as specifically religious.  
 
2
 It is also possible to argue that everyday life has the qualities it often does because 
within it people strive to realize a value of interactional flow unbroken by various kinds 
of transactional disfluencies (see, e.g. the work of Garfinkel 1967).  The importance of 
this value for actors in everyday life encourages them to background various value 
conflicts that arise, settling for value compromises where in transcendent contexts they 
might not do so.  If this analysis is correct, it indicates one way in which the everyday 
and ordinary themselves are not as effortlessly “immanent” and beyond values as they are 
sometimes represented.   
 
3
 Two of the reviewers of this paper raise the question of whether in this sentence and the 
one just above it I am implying that in any given social formation there will be a 
transcendent realm where the relationship between values is entirely coherent.  I do not 
mean to suggest this.  I have elsewhere discussed the fact that all religious traditions that 
I know of feature more than one kind of ritual and that often the different rituals in a 
tradition work to realize different values (Robbins 2014).  It is the transcendent modeling 
of single values, particularly in ritual, that I am concerned with here, not the ways 
relationships between different values are worked out in various social formations (an 
issue I take up in Robbins 2013). 
 
4
 I have considered another Urapmin Christian ritual from a similar point of view in 
Robbins 2015.  The kind of ethnographic material on the church service I present here is 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                 
gone over in much greater detail elsewhere, though some of the analytic emphases are 
slightly different in this account (Robbins 2004: 255-268). 
 
5
 I thank Frédéric Keck for pointing me to the relevance of this piece by Durkheim for 
my work more generally, and to Karsenti’s excellent discussion of it. 
 
6
 At this point, my argument joins a number of important recent attempts to explore the 
relationship between ordinary ethics and other types of ethics or morality (Clarke 2014, 
Keane 2014, 2015, Parkin Forthcoming).  Each of these authors shapes up his argument 
in his own terms, and all of them do so in terms different than the ones I use here, but I 
think it makes sense to see them as part of a related theoretical discussion. 
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